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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
BRAD RUSSELL CHILDS, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
HEATHER T. CHILDS, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
BRIEF OF THE APPELLEE 
L APPELLATE COURT JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is proper in this Court pursuant to §78-2a-3(2)(h) and pursuant to Rule 3 of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate procedure. 
H. STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW WITH SUPPORTING AUTHORITY 
A. The Appellee agrees with the Appellant that the first issue, whether Heather should 
have been estopped to claim that Brad Childs is not the adoptive father of Alex, would be reviewed 
under the correction of erred standard as set forth in Bailev v. Call 767 P.2d 138 (Utah App. 1989). 
B. Regarding the second issue raised by the Appellant, which is whether there was 
insufficient evidence to rebut the presumption that custody be awarded to the natural parent, the trial 
court's actions should not be disturbed unless the evidence clearly preponderates to the contrary or 
there has been an abuse of discretion. Woodward v. Woodward. 709 P.2d 393 (Utah App. 1985). 
Court of Appeals No. 970258-CA 
Civil No. 954901350DA 
C. As to the third issue raised by the Appellant, that the evidence was insufficient to 
award the minor children to the plaintiff, the correct standard of review is whether the trial court 
abused it's discretion. Woodward v. Woodward. 709 P.2d 393 (Utah App. 1985). 
D. As to the issue of whether the trial court should have allowed the plaintiff to provide 
day care for the children, the correct standard of review is whether the trial court abused it's 
discretion. Woodward v. Woodward. 709 P.2d 393 (Utah App. 1985). 
E. As to the issue of whether Heather was awarded insufficient alimony, the correct 
standard of review is whether the serious inequity has resulted such as to manifest a clear abuse of 
discretion. Rudman v. Rudman. 812 P.2d 73 (Utah App. 1991). 
F. That on the issue of whether the trial court failed to award Heather sufficient 
attorney's fees, the correct standard of review is whether the trial court abused its's discretion. 
Rudman v. Rudman, 812 P.2d 73 (Utah App. 1991). 
HI. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
A. In replying to Heather's first contention, that she should have been estopped from 
asserting that her former husband, Brad Childs, did not adopt Alex Childs, the Court is asked to 
consider that the trial court did not estop Heather from claiming that there had been an adoption. 
The trial court did estop Heather from asserting the natural parent presumption. The trial court 
properly estopped Heather from claiming the natural parent presumption based on the actions that 
she has undertook over the years and the fact that the trial court found that if Heather were able to 
repudiate her actions, Brad or perhaps more importantly the minor child would suffer a detriment. 
2 
Regardless of whether Heather should be estopped from asserting the natural parent presumption, 
the trial court's conclusion can also be supported on the basis of waiver Heather, through her 
actions, which are again set forth amply in the trial court's Findings of Fact, waived any rights she 
may have had to claim the natural parent presumption These actions include, but are not limited 
to, Heather choosing not to assert the natural parent presumption but to rather seek custody of all 
three children and then require that Brad pay child support for all three children Only when the 
custody evaluation did not come back in Heather's favor, did she attempt to assert the natural parent 
presumption 
T%. If the Court finds that Heather should not have been estopped from asserting the 
natural parent presumption and that Heather did not waive the natural parent presumption, the 
Appellant then argues that the trial court was not required to impose the natural parent presumption 
as it did not serve the best interest of the parties minor children In support of this contention, the 
Appellee requests that the court review the Findings made by the trial court regarding Heather's 
behavior The Appellee contends that this absolutely horrendous behavior would certainly have 
allowed the trial court to determine that applying the natural parent presumption was not in the best 
interest of the minor children 
(J. Should the Court determine that Heather should not have been estopped from 
asserting the natural parent presumption, nor should the trial court's conclusion be supported by the 
doctrine of waiver, and that the trial court was required to apply the natural parent presumption, the 
Court is asked to consider that the trial court did properly conclude that the natural parent 
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presumption was rebutted and that Heather and Brad should stand on equal footing and that the trial 
court was to make a custody determination based on the best interest of the children In support of 
this contention, Appellee makes reference to the Findings of Fact that the trial court made which 
detail Heather's horrendous, inhumane behavior This emotionally abusive, horrendous, inhumane 
behavior also serves to show that the trial court did not abuse it's discretion in not awarding Heather 
custody of the children and in refusing to allow Heather to provide day care for the minor children 
D The final issues relate to whether the court abused it's discretion in awarding Heather 
temporary alimony of $350 per month and an attorney's fee of $1,000 Related to these issues are 
the arguments that the trial court was well within it's discretion to reduce any alimony award to 
Heather Childs on the basis of fault and that Heather has failed to demonstrate that Brad had an 
ability to pay her greater than an attorney's fee of $1,000 
IV. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A Factual Findings of the trial court which support it's conclusion that Heather should 
be estopped from asserting the natural parent presumption 
1 That Heather and Brad Childs were married on December 14, 1990 (record, 
page 422) 
2. That on January 6, 1988, Heather gave birth to the minor child known as Alex 
Childs Brad Childs is not Alex's biological father (record, page 423) 
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3 Subsequent to the parties' marriage two children were born, Patches Childs, 
who was born on June 12, 1991, and Brooke Childs, who was born on September 8, 1993 (record 
page 423) 
4 That during the marriage Brad provided the sole financial support for Alex 
(record, page 423) 
5 Heather did not seek child support from Alex's biological father nor did the 
biological father provide financial support nor seek visitation or contact Alex in any way (record 
page 423) 
6 That since the parties' marriage, Brad was the only individual who has ever 
acted as Alex's father Brad and Alex established a positive stable, nurturing, father/son relationship 
with Heather's aid, assistance, encouragement, and permission (record, page 424) 
7 Immediately after the parties married, they agreed that Brad should adopt 
Alex (record, page 424) 
8 Heather consistently told Brad, and other family members, that she wanted 
Brad to be on equal footing with all of the children in light of the mutual love, respect and honor 
shared by Brad and Alex (record, page 424) 
9 That Brad and Heather sought legal advice regarding an adoption of Alex 
They learned of a one year waiting requirement and adoption costs At that time, Heather was 
pregnant and the parties had limited financial resources and were concerned about adoption costs 
(record, page 424) 
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10 Brad and Heather were later advised that Brad could formally adopt Alex by 
filling in his name on Alex's birth certificate and that doing so would be an inexpensive method of 
accomplishing the adoption (record, page 424) 
11. Heather encouraged Brad to add his name to Alex's birth certificate to 
formalize the adoption Brad relied on Heather's advice and encouragement and both Brad and 
Heather believed that the adoption would be accomplished in this matter (record, pages 424 and 
425) 
12 Brad and Heather did complete the necessary paperwork for Alex's birth 
certificate to be amended representing Brad as Alex's biological father (record, page 425) 
13 Both Brad and Heather believed that Brad had adopted Alex Throughout the 
marriage, Heather, Brad and Alex represented to everyone that Brad was Alex's father (record, page 
425) 
14 Brad relied on Heather's actions wherein Heather provided the opportunity 
for Brad and Alex to establish a father/son relationship (record, page 425) 
15 That Brad and Alex would be injured if Heather were allowed to now assert 
the parental presumption (record, page 425) 
B. Factual Findings of the trial court that support waiver 
1 Brad filed his Complaint for divorce on March 31, 1995 Brad requested 
temporary custody of all of the minor children Heather filed a Motion for Temporary Custody in 
which she sought custody and child support for all three of the minor children without any challenge 
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to Alex's purported adoption (record, page 425) 
2 Heather participated in the initial custody evaluation and did not communicate 
to the evaluator any challenge of Brad's purported adoption of Alex The evaluation was completed 
on the premise that Brad had lawfully adopted Alex (record, page 425) 
3 The custody evaluation was completed on September 26, 1995 and 
recommended joint custody with Brad having primary physical custody of all minor children 
(record, page 426) 
4 That on October 25, 1995, after receiving the unfavorable custody evaluation, 
Heather, for the first time, filed an Answer and Counterclaim challenging Brad's adoption of Alex 
and asserting the natural parent presumption (record, page 426) 
C Findings of Fact of the trial court that support it's conclusion that the natural parent 
presumption had been rebutted 
1 " , this court is unable to conclude that Defendant's bond to the children is 
strong, because she chose to have an affair with a married man and pursue her own needs to the 
detriment and sacrifice of the needs of her minor children Defendant's horrendous verbal and 
emotional abuse of the minor children clearly establishes that the defendant lacks the sympathy for 
and understanding of the needs of her children that is characteristic of parents generally The 
evidence is clear and convincing that defendant generally lacks all of the characteristics that give 
rise to the parental presumption " (record, page 434) 
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D Factual determinations made by the trial court that support it's conclusion that the 
natural parent presumption was rebutted 
1. " defendant began working three nights per week, spending time with 
friends on other nights and would regularly return home around 3 00 a m to 5 00 a m " (record, 
page 426). 
2. "In approximately December of 1994, defendant spent an increasing amount 
of time with a married man, Allen M. Morrical. Defendant would spend time with Mr Morrical 
during the day, either at her home or at Mr Morrical's home while plaintiff was at work During this 
time defendant would leave the marital home or work most evenings to spend time with Mr 
Morrical, typically not returning to the marital home until early in the morning hours " (record, page 
426) 
3 "Defendant placed her relationship with Mr Morrical above and ahead of her 
parental duties and responsibilities which had a negative impact on her minor children " (record, 
page 427) 
4 " that the defendant degrades the children, degrades the plaintiff in front of 
the children, resulting in emotional abuse of the children A few examples of the defendant's 
disparaging remarks made in the presence of the children include 
"I hope your dad gets in a car crash and dies " 
"Brad (plaintiff) doesn't love you " 
"I don't know why I had you fucking kids." 
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"I'm fucking sick of you kids, I'm sending you to Green River." 
"I don't give a fuck where plaintiff is, he is a worthless piece of shit anyway." (record, pages 
427 and 428). 
5. "Defendant is very vindictive, and angry as established by her regular 
disparaging remarks of plaintiff in front of their children. The testimony of family members, friends, 
the custody evaluation, and the defendant's demeanor on the witness stand further establish 
defendant's mean, vindictive nature. The defendant's vindictive nature makes her far less likely to 
allow plaintiff to maintain a healthy relationship with the children if defendant was awarded 
custody. In fact, the defendant has threatened to take the children to Mexico if plaintiff is awarded 
custody. Based upon defendant's level of anger, defendant's threat should be taken seriously." 
(record, page 428). 
6. "The court finds that the defendant's moral character is certainly questionable 
based upon her untruthful testimony, her chicanery in trying to intentionally provoke plaintiff to hit 
her and defendant's conscious choice to place her individual needs and the demands of her 
extramarital affair above her children. Furthermore, defendant's regular swearing at the children, 
the derogatory remarks about plaintiff in front of the children, and defendant's inability to put the 
needs of the children above her own needs demonstrates poor emotional stability." (record, pages 
429 and 430). 
7. "The court finds that the defendant threatened plaintiff and his family that 
they will not see the children if the defendant is awarded custody. Based upon defendant's 
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continually harsh demeanor towards the plaintiff and his family, the court finds that the defendant 
is not likely to allow plaintiff to maintain frequent and meaningful contact with the children should 
she be awarded custody." (record, page 431). 
E. Factual Findings of the trial court relating to Brad Childs' parental ability. 
1. "Both prior to and subsequent to the parties' separation, the plaintiff has 
provided a stable environment for the children in which the children appear to be thriving." (record, 
page 429). 
2. "Plaintiff is involved in the children's lives, is an appropriate disciplinarian 
and is supportive of the children's educational needs and extracurricular activities." (record, page 
429). 
3. "The plaintiff has kept the children well dressed and groomed and is watchful 
of the children when they are in his care." (record, page 429). 
4. "During the pendency of this action the children have done well in plaintiffs 
primary care. Plaintiff has assisted Alex and Patches in their homework and other school and 
extracurricular activities. The children's best interests are served by continuing the previously 
determined custody arrangement with plaintiff in light of plaintiffs demonstrated sound moral 
character and emotional stability." (record, page 429). 
5. "Plaintiffs desire for custody has been continual and deep. Plaintiff adjusted 
his work schedule so he could be available for the children. Plaintiff treated Alex as his own son 
without any distinction whatsoever. Plaintiff has maintained regular employment and is more able 
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to provide the necessary resources to raise the minor children. Plaintiff has demonstrated the ability 
to place the needs of the minor children above his own." (record, page 430). 
6. "That plaintiff, with the assistance of his extended family, can provide quality 
personal and surrogate care for the children." (record, page 430). 
POINT I 
THE COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT HEATHER SHOULD BE 
ESTOPPED FROM ASSERTING THE NATURAL PARENT PRESUMPTION. 
Point I (A.) of Heather's argument is entitled "THE DEFENDANT IS NOT ESTOPPED TO 
CLAIM THAT PLAINTIFF IS NOT THE ADOPTIVE FATHER OF ALEX." Heather goes on to 
argue that the adoption statutes must be strictly complied with; and that the purpose for this strict 
compliance is to protect the best interest of children. Heather concludes that as she and Brad did 
not strictly comply with adoption statutes that the trial court erred in estopping her from asserting 
that Brad is not Alex's adoptive father. 
Heather has misstated the trial court's legal conclusion. The trial court did not conclude that 
Heather should be estopped from claiming that Brad had adopted Alex. The trial court did conclude 
that Heather was estopped from asserting the natural parent presumption. 
Heather sets forth cases that support the argument that she should not have been estopped 
from asserting that Brad did not adopt Alex. There is no need to review those cases as the trial court 
did not conclude that Heather is estopped from asserting an adoption. The Appellee will take this 
opportunity to discuss the correctness of the conclusion the trial court did reach; that Heather be 
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estopped from asserting the natural parent presumption. 
In Perkins v. Great-West Life Assurance Co.. 814 P.2d 1125 (Utah App. 1991), this Court 
stated that: 
Equitable estoppel is defined as "conduct by one party which leads another 
party in reliance thereon, to adopt course of action resulting in detriment or damage 
if the first party is permitted to repudiate his conduct." Id at 1130 (citations 
omitted). 
In the instant case, the trial court found that both of the requirements of estoppel had been 
met; conduct that induces reliance and that repudiation of that conduct would cause a detriment. 
Specifically, in Finding No. 13 (page 425 of the record) the trial court stated that Brad "relied upon 
defendant's actions wherein defendant provided an opportunity for plaintiff and Alex to establish 
a father/son relationship." As to the second requirement of estoppel; detriment caused by 
repudiation, the trial court stated (also in Finding No. 13), that "plaintiff and Alex would be injured 
if defendant were allowed now to assert the parental presumption..." 
. The trial court made more Findings. In these Findings the trial court set forth the numerous 
actions of Heather's upon which Brad relied upon. These findings are also set forth in subsection 
A of the Statement of Facts. Heather does not attack these findings. As the trial court did find that 
Brad relied on Heather's actions and found that both Brad and Alex would be injured if Heather were 
to assert the parental presumption, the trial court properly estopped Heather from asserting the 
natural parent presumption. 
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POINT n 
HEATHER WAIVED ANY RIGHTS SHE MAY HAVE HAD TO CLAIM 
THE NATURAL PARENT PRESUMPTION. 
The trial court's conclusion that Heather should be estopped from asserting the natural 
parent presumption can also be supported by the doctrine of waiver. Although the trial court did not 
base its ruling on waiver, the Appellee notes that in Embassy Group. Inc. v. Hatch. 865 P.2d 1366 
(Utah App. 1993), this Court stated that: 
"... we are also guided by the principle that this court may affirm a trial 
court's decision on any proper ground, even though the trial court may have premised 
its ruling on a different ground. Id at 1370 (citations omitted). 
In Beckstead v. Deseret Roofing Co.. Inc.. 831 P.2d 130 (Utah App. 1992), this Court 
defined waiver as: 
"the voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a known right. To waive a 
right, there must be an existing right, knowledge of its existence, and an intent to 
relinquish it. The intent to relinquish a right can be implied from conduct, if the 
parties' conduct unequivocally evince(s) an intent to waive or (is) at least ... 
inconsistent with any other intent." Id at 133 (citations omitted). 
Heather waived any right she may have had to claim the natural parent presumption. Heather 
certainly knew she had a right to claim the natural parent presumption. The trial court found that 
when the custody evaluation came back in Brad's favor, Heather then attempted to claim the natural 
parent presumption. According to the decision in Beckstead the intention to relinquish a right can 
be implied from conduct. Heather's conduct does imply an intent to relinquish any right she may 
have had to claim the natural parent presumption. The trial court found that Heather initially chose 
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not to raise the natural parent presumption. The trial court found that Heather sought custody of all 
three children as well as to have Brad pay child support. Heather then participated in the custody 
evaluation, and did not tell the custody evaluator that Brad was not Alex's father. Only after the 
custody evaluation was completed and the custody evaluation recommended that Brad have primary 
custody and only after the court awarded Brad temporary custody of all three children did Heather 
seek to assert the natural parent presumption. 
Having initially elected to waive any right that she may have had to assert the natural 
parent presumption, Heather should not be allowed, when it is strategically advantageous for her to 
do so, to then decide to assert the natural parent presumption. 
POINT m 
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO REBUT THE 
NATURAL PARENT PRESUMPTION. 
Heather contends the evidence was not sufficient to rebut the natural parent 
presumption. In Hutchison v. Hutchison. 649 P.2d 38 (Utah 1982) the Court addressed a dispute 
between a natural mother and a stepparent. The Court held that in considering disputes between 
parents and non-parents there is a presumption in favor of the natural parent. The Court held that 
the natural parent presumption can be rebutted by showing: 
"evidence establishing that a particular parent at a particular time generally 
lacks all three of the characteristics that give rise to the presumption: (i) that no 
strong mutual bond exists, (ii) that the parent has not demonstrated a willingness to 
sacrifice his or her own interest and welfare for the child's, and (iii) that the parent 
lacks the sympathy for and understanding of the child that is characteristic of parents 
generally." Id. at 41. 
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In Hutchison the court also held that when the natural parent presumption is rebutted 
contestants stand on equal footing and custody is to be awarded as is required by the best interest 
of the child. Heather certainly has the right to argue that the evidence was insufficient to support 
the trial court's conclusion that the natural parent presumption was rebutted. With this right comes 
an obligation. According to the ruling in Riche v. Riche. 784 P.2d 465, (Utah App. 1989), Heather 
has the obligation to: 
"marshall the evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate that 
despite the evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking as to be 'against the clear 
weight of the evidence', thus making them 'clearly erroneous'. IdL at 486. 
Heather hardly makes what could be called an effort to marshall the evidence that supports 
the trial court's conclusion that Heather generally lacked the three factors that give rise to the natural 
parent presumption. Heather's cursory effort to marshall the evidence is to state that "the court 
merely determined which person would, in its view, be a better custodian, ..." That is not what the 
trial court did. As to the first requirement, that no strong mutual bond exists, the trial court stated: 
"This court is unable to conclude that defendant's bond to the children is strong, because she chose 
to have an affair with a married man and pursue her own needs to the detriment and sacrifice of the 
needs of her minor children." (Conclusions of Law Number 4, page 434 of the record). As to the 
second Hutchison factor, a parent's failure to sacrifice his or her own interest and welfare for the 
child, the trial court concluded that Heather "... placing her affair was a pursuit of her own needs 
to the detriment of her children and demonstrated a lack of willingness to sacrifice her own needs 
for those of her children." (Conclusions of Law No. 4, page 434 of the record). As to the third 
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Hutchison factor, a lack of sympathy for and understanding of a child characteristic of parents 
generally, the trial court concluded that Heather's "horrendous verbal and emotional abuse of the 
minor children clearly establishes that the defendant lacks the sympathy for and understanding of 
the needs of her children that is characteristic of parents generally." The trial court concluded that 
the evidence "is clear and convincing that defendant lacks all of the characteristics that give rise to 
the parental presumption." (Conclusions of Law No. 4, page 434 of the record). 
The trial court made numerous Findings that support the above mentioned conclusions. 
These factual Findings are set forth in detail in subsection D of the Statement of Facts. 
Heather contends that the trial court erred because its Findings and Conclusions are different 
than the conclusion reached by the custody evaluator. It should be noted that the custody evaluator 
would have made Brad the primary custodian of the minor children. Heather seems to be suggesting 
that the recommendation of the custody evaluator is entitled to a presumption of unquestioned 
validity. As marvelous a job as custody evaluators do, they are not judges. It is the trial court judge 
who, based on all of the evidence must determine which custodial arrangement would be in the best 
interest of the children. 
In Tuckev v. Tuckev. 649 P.2d 88 (Utah 1982), the Court held that: 
"... although the trial court was not bound to accept the evaluation of the 
Department of Social Services, the court indicated no reason for totally dismissing 
the report submitted under court order. In light of the trial court's own factual 
findings which support the recommendation of the Department, we think some 
reason for rejecting the recommendation and awarding custody on the basis of rather 
frail findings is in order." Id. at 91. 
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The ruling in Tuckey suggests that where the trial court has made findings that are consistent 
with a custody evaluation yet rejects the conclusion of the evaluation, then the trial court should set 
forth Findings why the court is not following the evaluation In paragraph 24 of its findings, (page 
428 of the record), the trial court stated why it was not following the recommendation of joint 
custody The court stated as follows " However, this Court finds that based upon defendant's 
emotional instability and uncooperativeness, joint custody would not be in the best interest of the 
minor children " 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT NEED NOT APPLY THE NATURAL PARENT 
PRESUMPTION WHEN THE PRESUMPTION DOES NOT SERVE 
THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILDREN 
Heather seems to suggest that the trial court had no option but to apply the natural parent 
presumption Such a suggestion would be erroneous Should this court find that Heather was not 
estopped from asserting the natural parent presumption or that Heather did not waive any right she 
may have had to claim the natural parent presumption, this Court is asked to consider that the natural 
parent presumption need not be applied when it does not serve the best interest of the children 
In Kishpaughv Kishpaugh. 745 P 2d 1248 (Utah 1987), the Court held that the three-
prong test of Hutchison is flexible and is subservient to the child's best interest Discussing the 
Hutchison requirement that there must be a general lack of the three characteristics of the Hutchison 
test, the Kishpaugh Court stated 
17 
"Hutchison itself indicates that it does not establish a wooden formula to 
which all trial court findings must conform . . . Obviously, a "general" lack is not an 
absolute lack. Thus, the standard articulated in Hutchison is somewhat flexible. . . 
Hutchison assures that a trial court will focus on three central characteristics in 
making its evaluation; however, the purpose of the presumption-furthering the best 
interests of the child—is in no way advanced by requiring a formulaic statement of 
the trial court's conclusions regarding those characteristics." Id at 1251. 
After holding that the Hutchison test is based on a presumption of serving the best interest 
of the child and is not to be mechanically applied, in a footnote the Court stated that the Hutchison 
test should not be used when it does not serve the best interest of the child. 
"We have not hesitated to find the presumption inapplicable when we have 
concluded that it does not serve the best interests of the child in a particular class of 
cases." IdLat 1251. 
The question in the instant case then becomes whether or not an application of the natural 
parent presumption served the best interest of the children. It can be argued that as the trial court 
concluded that the natural parent presumption was rebutted, that this question is academic. 
Nonetheless, the Court is asked to consider that the trial court need not have applied the natural 
parent presumption as the presumption did not serve the best interest of the children. The proof for 
this contention is found in the Findings of Fact that the trial court made regarding the parties. While 
the trial court made positive Findings regarding Brad and his ability to parent, the trial court 
referenced paragraph after paragraph, page after page of Heather's horrendous, inhumane actions. 
These actions are extensively detailed in subsection D of the Statement of Facts. Given these 
horrendous, inhumane actions, the trial court was not required to apply the natural parent 
presumption. 
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POINT V 
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE MINOR 
CHILDREN SHOULD HAVE BEEN AWARDED TO BRAD 
Despite mountains of evidence and explicit Findings made by the trial court, Heather 
claims that the evidence was insufficient to award the children to Brad. Throughout this brief the 
Appellee has made reference to the evidence and the factual Findings made by the trial court which 
support the conclusion that the best interest of the children required that they be awarded to Brad. 
As these facts have been amply set forth in preceding portions of the brief, as well as in the 
Statement of Facts, the Appellee will assert that a review of the Findings of Fact easily supports the 
conclusion that the trial court did not abuse its wide discretion in awarding custody of the children 
to Brad. 
POINT VI 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
REFUSING HEATHER TO PROVIDE DAY CARE FOR THE MINOR CHILDREN 
As has been set forth numerous time throughout this brief, the trial court found that Heather 
emotionally abused the children, placed her relationship with a married man above and ahead of her 
parental duties and responsibilities which impacted the children negatively, lied in open court, that 
Heather degrades the children and Brad, is vindictive and angry, has threatened to take the children 
to Mexico, (a threat that the trial court found should be taken seriously), is emotionally unstable and 
uncooperative, of questionable moral character, engages in chicanery, swears at the children, and 
demonstrated an inability to put the needs of the parties' children above her own needs. The trial 
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court also made Findings regarding Brad Childs. Those Findings are set forth in subsection E of the 
Statement of Facts. These Findings can accurately be referred to as positive regarding Brad's ability 
to take care of the children. Given the positive Findings that the court has made regarding Brad, and 
given the trial court's Findings regarding Heather it can hardly be seriously asserted that the trial 
court abused its discretion in refusing to allow Heather to provide day care for the children. 
POINT VH 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
AWARDING HEATHER TEMPORARY ALIMONY OF $350.00 PER MONTH 
In Rudman v. Rudman, 812 P.2d 73 (Utah App. 1991), this Court reviewed the often cited 
three factors that the trial court must consider in determining alimony, those factors being: 
"(1) the financial condition and needs of the receiving spouse, (2) the ability 
of the receiving spouse to produce sufficient income for him- or herself, and (3) the 
ability of the responding spouse to provide support." IcL at 76. 
This Court then went on to state that: 
"So long as these three factors are considered, we will disturb a trial court's 
decision concerning alimony only upon a showing 'that such a serious inequity has 
resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion.'" Id at 76 (citations omitted). 
The trial court did consider all three of the above-mentioned alimony related factors. 
Heather makes reference to the court's consideration of these factors in her brief As the trial court 
did consider all three of the alimony considerations, it cannot be argued that the trial court abused 
its discretion. 
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It is acknowledged that the award of alimony may not have been sufficient to make up the 
shortfall between Heather's monthly financial needs and the income that she can generate. It is 
further acknowledged that Brad may have had the ability to pay alimony in an amount equal to the 
shortfall between Heather's monthly needs and monthly income. The trial court indicated that it was 
considering Heather's fault in making the alimony award. Pursuant to §30-3-5(7)(b) Utah Code 
Ann., the trial court"... may consider the fault of the parties in determining alimony." There is no 
case law nor statutory guidance as to how much or how little an alimony award is to be effected by 
fault. In the absence of such guidance, the trial court may adjust alimony based on fault as long as 
such adjustment did not result in a clear abuse of the trial court's discretion. Given the Findings that 
the trial court made regarding Heather's behavior, the trial court's adjustment of alimony is well 
within the trial court's discretion. 
POINT vra 
HEATHER HAS FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT 
THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN AWARDING 
HER AN ATTORNEY'S FEE OF $1,000.00 
This Court stated that in Rudman v. Rudman. 812 P.2d 73 (Utah App. 1991), that: 
"The decision to award fees rests within the sound discretion of the trial 
court, but, as with alimony awards, the decision must be based on evidence of 
financial need and reasonableness. ... We will reverse an award of attorney fees and 
costs when either financial need or reasonableness has not been shown." IdL at 77 
(citations omitted). 
Heather has failed to demonstrate that the award of attorney's fees of $1,000 was 
unreasonable. Heather does accurately recap that Brad's income is greater than her income. Heather 
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does little more than to point out the differences in the parties' incomes. Heather does not state, for 
example, what debts or obligations Brad has or provide any other information related to Brad's 
ability to pay attorney's fees. Having made only a cursory attempt to demonstrate that the trial 
court's ruling was inequitable and failing to make any serious attempt to marshall the evidence in 
this regard, Heather's contention that the trial court abused its discretion is without merit. 
V. CONCLUSION 
That the Appellee respectfully requests that this Court affirm the ruling of the trial court. 
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VI. ADDENDUM 
A. No addendum is necessary. 
Respectfully submitted this 13 th day of March, 1998. 
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN 
for Plaintiff7Appellee 
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